| Foreword |
|
xi | |
| Preface |
|
xv | |
|
The Constitutional Imperative |
|
|
3 | (20) |
|
|
|
3 | (2) |
|
|
|
5 | (3) |
|
|
|
8 | (2) |
|
|
|
10 | (6) |
|
Rules of the Market Order |
|
|
16 | (2) |
|
|
|
18 | (1) |
|
|
|
19 | (4) |
|
|
|
23 | (15) |
|
|
|
23 | (1) |
|
Noncontractarian Constitutionalism |
|
|
24 | (1) |
|
Individuals as Sources of Value |
|
|
25 | (2) |
|
|
|
27 | (2) |
|
Politics in the Exchange Perspective |
|
|
29 | (2) |
|
Unanimity as the Contractual Ideal |
|
|
31 | (2) |
|
Agreement on Rules and the Veils of Ignorance and Uncertainty |
|
|
33 | (3) |
|
|
|
36 | (2) |
|
|
|
38 | (15) |
|
|
|
38 | (1) |
|
Private Good and Public Good |
|
|
39 | (4) |
|
Science, Truth, and Politics |
|
|
43 | (3) |
|
The Authoritarian Imperative |
|
|
46 | (2) |
|
Majoritarian Democracy in the Noncontractarian Paradigm |
|
|
48 | (2) |
|
|
|
50 | (3) |
|
Modeling the Individual for Constitutional Analysis |
|
|
53 | (23) |
|
|
|
53 | (3) |
|
Homo economicus in Politics: The Argument for Symmetry |
|
|
56 | (2) |
|
Science and the Empiricist Defense |
|
|
58 | (1) |
|
A Methodological Defense of the Differential Interest Model of Behavior |
|
|
59 | (2) |
|
Social Evaluation and Quasi--Risk Aversion |
|
|
61 | (7) |
|
Gresham's Law in Politics |
|
|
68 | (5) |
|
|
|
73 | (3) |
|
Time, Temptation, and the Constrained Future |
|
|
76 | (16) |
|
|
|
76 | (1) |
|
Individual Private Choice |
|
|
|
|
|
77 | (1) |
|
|
|
77 | (1) |
|
Preferences for Preferences |
|
|
78 | (2) |
|
Past, Present, and Future |
|
|
80 | (3) |
|
|
|
|
|
|
83 | (1) |
|
|
|
84 | (1) |
|
|
|
85 | (2) |
|
|
|
87 | (2) |
|
Moral Rules and/or Constitutional Commitment |
|
|
89 | (3) |
|
Politics Without Rules, I: Time and Nonconstrained Collective Action |
|
|
92 | (16) |
|
|
|
92 | (1) |
|
|
|
93 | (1) |
|
|
|
94 | (7) |
|
|
|
101 | (3) |
|
|
|
104 | (2) |
|
|
|
106 | (1) |
|
|
|
107 | (1) |
|
|
|
108 | (17) |
|
|
|
108 | (1) |
|
Just Conduct and the Notion of Desert |
|
|
109 | (2) |
|
Justice and Promise Keeping |
|
|
111 | (6) |
|
|
|
117 | (2) |
|
Just Rules, Agreed-on Rules, and Just Conduct |
|
|
119 | (4) |
|
|
|
123 | (2) |
|
Politics Without Rules, II: Distributive Justice and Distributive Politics |
|
|
125 | (24) |
|
|
|
125 | (1) |
|
Distributive Justice: The Conventional View |
|
|
126 | (2) |
|
The Constitutional Perspective and Institutional Incidence |
|
|
128 | (3) |
|
The Incidence of Unrestricted Majoritarianism |
|
|
131 | (4) |
|
Tax Rules and Distribution under Majority Rule |
|
|
135 | (7) |
|
Direct Constitutionalism and Distributive Justice |
|
|
142 | (4) |
|
|
|
146 | (3) |
|
Is Constitutional Revolution Possible in Democracy? |
|
|
149 | (20) |
|
|
|
149 | (2) |
|
Pareto-Superior Change and Wicksellian Unanimity |
|
|
151 | (1) |
|
Distributional Limits and Prospective Rules |
|
|
152 | (3) |
|
Status Quo Entitlements and Distributional Envy |
|
|
155 | (5) |
|
Constitutional Change and Free Riders |
|
|
160 | (2) |
|
|
|
162 | (3) |
|
|
|
165 | (4) |
| Index |
|
169 | |