The Reason of Rules

by
Format: Hardcover
Pub. Date: 2000-07-01
Publisher(s): Liberty Fund
List Price: $24.00

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Summary

In his foreword, Robert D Tollison identifies the main objective of Geoffrey Brennan and James M Buchanan's THE REASON OF RULES: "...a book-length attempt to focus the energies of economists and other social analysts on the nature and function of the rules under which ordinary political life and market life function." In persuasive style, Brennan and Buchanan argue that too often economists become mired in explaining the obvious or constructing elaborate mathematical models to shed light on trivial phenomena. Their solution: economics as a discipline would be better focused on deriving normative procedures for establishing rules so that ordinary economic life can proceed unaffected as much as possible by social issues. In THE REASON OF RULES, Brennan and Buchanan sketch out a methodological and analytical framework for the establishment of rules. They point out that the consideration of rules has its roots in classical economics and has been hinted at in the work of some contemporary economists. But the enterprise of applying the analytical rigor of modern economics to the establishment of effective rules is the little-traveled road that bears the most promise. In fact, the basic idea of the importance of rules is a thread that runs through virtually the whole of Buchanan's distinguished career, and it is one of his signal contributions to the contemporary discipline of economics. THE REASON OF RULES is an elaboration of the potential for rules and the normative process by which they can best be devised.

Table of Contents

Foreword xi
Preface xv
The Constitutional Imperative
3(20)
Introduction
3(2)
Reasons for Rules
5(3)
Rules of Games
8(2)
Rules of the Road
10(6)
Rules of the Market Order
16(2)
Rules of Political Order
18(1)
The Importance of Rules
19(4)
The Contractarian Vision
23(15)
Introduction
23(1)
Noncontractarian Constitutionalism
24(1)
Individuals as Sources of Value
25(2)
Contract and Exchange
27(2)
Politics in the Exchange Perspective
29(2)
Unanimity as the Contractual Ideal
31(2)
Agreement on Rules and the Veils of Ignorance and Uncertainty
33(3)
Conclusions
36(2)
The Myth of Benevolence
38(15)
Introduction
38(1)
Private Good and Public Good
39(4)
Science, Truth, and Politics
43(3)
The Authoritarian Imperative
46(2)
Majoritarian Democracy in the Noncontractarian Paradigm
48(2)
The Aim of Politics
50(3)
Modeling the Individual for Constitutional Analysis
53(23)
Introduction
53(3)
Homo economicus in Politics: The Argument for Symmetry
56(2)
Science and the Empiricist Defense
58(1)
A Methodological Defense of the Differential Interest Model of Behavior
59(2)
Social Evaluation and Quasi--Risk Aversion
61(7)
Gresham's Law in Politics
68(5)
Summary
73(3)
Time, Temptation, and the Constrained Future
76(16)
Preface
76(1)
Individual Private Choice
Introduction
77(1)
The Ultimate Z's
77(1)
Preferences for Preferences
78(2)
Past, Present, and Future
80(3)
Individual Public Choice
Introduction
83(1)
Society with a History
84(1)
Temporal Interdependence
85(2)
An Illustration
87(2)
Moral Rules and/or Constitutional Commitment
89(3)
Politics Without Rules, I: Time and Nonconstrained Collective Action
92(16)
Introduction
92(1)
The Social Discount Rate
93(1)
The High-Tax Trap
94(7)
The Inflation Trap
101(3)
The Public-Debt Trap
104(2)
Other Examples
106(1)
Conclusions
107(1)
Rules and Justice
108(17)
Introduction
108(1)
Just Conduct and the Notion of Desert
109(2)
Justice and Promise Keeping
111(6)
Justice among Rules
117(2)
Just Rules, Agreed-on Rules, and Just Conduct
119(4)
Conclusions
123(2)
Politics Without Rules, II: Distributive Justice and Distributive Politics
125(24)
Introduction
125(1)
Distributive Justice: The Conventional View
126(2)
The Constitutional Perspective and Institutional Incidence
128(3)
The Incidence of Unrestricted Majoritarianism
131(4)
Tax Rules and Distribution under Majority Rule
135(7)
Direct Constitutionalism and Distributive Justice
142(4)
Summary
146(3)
Is Constitutional Revolution Possible in Democracy?
149(20)
Introduction
149(2)
Pareto-Superior Change and Wicksellian Unanimity
151(1)
Distributional Limits and Prospective Rules
152(3)
Status Quo Entitlements and Distributional Envy
155(5)
Constitutional Change and Free Riders
160(2)
The Role of Norms
162(3)
Toward a Civic Religion
165(4)
Index 169

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